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BTC $64,593.06 +0.69%
ETH $1,903.00 +1.65%
BNB $593.66 -0.50%
XRP $1.04 -1.60%
SOL $73.31 -0.95%
TRX $0.3271 -0.32%
DOGE $0.0690 -1.19%
ADA $0.1896 -3.25%
BCH $211.88 -0.74%
LINK $8.09 -1.01%
HYPE $55.46 -3.27%
AAVE $87.88 -3.81%
SUI $0.6727 -2.80%
XLM $0.1600 -3.58%
ZEC $501.11 -3.37%

Analysis: The average time from Tether's freeze proposal to execution exceeds 2 hours, allowing high-risk addresses to transfer funds by taking advantage of the time difference

2026-08-06 16:58:00

FlashRescue co-founder @DarcyAri posted on the X platform that recently, during a joint investigation with partners on a case, Tether experienced a transfer of funds from one address during the execution of a proposal to freeze addresses, resulting in a decrease in the frozen amount. Further review by FlashRescue revealed that this is not an isolated incident. As of August 3, 2026, through an analysis of 2,955 Tether freeze events on the Ethereum and Tron networks, it was found that among addresses involved in risks such as entity sanctions, fraudulent activities, money laundering, FATF blacklist jurisdictions, and malicious attacks: 60 addresses cleared their assets and completed front-running transfers before the formal execution of the freeze, with a total net outflow of 20,429,847 USDT, starting transfers an average of 13 minutes and 59 seconds after the freeze proposal was submitted, and completing the main fund transfers within 15 minutes and 15 seconds; additionally, 113 addresses transferred some assets before the freeze was executed, involving approximately 35,524,300 USDT.

The average time from the submission of the freeze proposal to the formal execution of the freeze by Tether is 2 hours, 16 minutes, and 15 seconds, indicating a long time window between the public announcement of the freeze proposal and its actual execution. On July 3, a cluster of addresses transferred funds continuously within minutes and then split the transfers to the same address. The above cases suggest that some high-risk addresses may be actively monitoring Tether freeze proposals and utilizing the time difference between the public announcement of the proposal and the actual effectiveness of the freeze to implement front-running transfers. This mechanism leads to the failure of freezing the involved funds and undermines the actual effectiveness of sanctions, anti-money laundering, and law enforcement cooperation measures.

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