blockse

On July 17, Interlace and BlockSec jointly held the summit "The Next Decade of Payments: Digital Currency, AI Agents, and the New Global Financial Order." The event brought together industry guests from AI, Web3, security, and payments to discuss the development trends of stablecoin payments, security compliance, AI agents, and global payment infrastructure.BlockSec co-founder Zhou Yajin and Interlace founder and CEO Michael Wu delivered keynote speeches on "Security and Compliance in Crypto Payments" and "Agentic Payment and the New Infrastructure of Global Finance," respectively, sharing their latest observations on the development trends of digital asset payments. As the scenarios for stablecoin payments continue to expand, the security compliance system and the construction of a new generation of payment infrastructure are becoming key supports for driving industry development. In the future, payment infrastructure will not only serve the function of capital flow but will also further evolve into a programmable, trusted, and verifiable value transfer system, providing underlying support for the connection between digital assets and real-world commerce.At the event, Interlace also officially released the white paper "The Value Transmission Layer of the AI Economy: From Concept to Implementation." The white paper was jointly initiated with ecosystem partners such as Bitget, BlockSec, Cobo, Conflux, Stable, Xagent, and Hetu, systematically defining the architecture, standards, and implementation paths of Agentic Payment infrastructure, providing a reference for value transfer in the era of the AI economy.

According to monitoring by BlockSec, a suspicious transaction targeting an unknown contract (Stake) on the BSC chain was discovered, resulting in a loss of approximately $133,000.The attacker exploited a vulnerability in the spot price dependency of the Stake contract, manipulated the TUR price in the TUR-NOBEL pool, and then staked TUR. Based on the inflated price, they triggered reward calculations and claimed the amplified rewards through a referral account, ultimately exchanging the stolen TUR for USDT to profit.

According to BlockSec monitoring, the PancakeSwap BCE-USDT pool on the BSC chain was attacked a few hours ago, resulting in a loss of approximately $679,000. The root cause lies in the flawed destruction mechanism of the BCE token.The attacker deployed two malicious contracts to bypass trading restrictions and trigger the destruction of tokens within the pool, profiting approximately $679,000 by manipulating the reserves in the BCE-USDT pool.

According to BlockSec monitoring, the DBXen contract was attacked this morning, with estimated losses of about $150,000. The root cause lies in the inconsistency of the sender's identity under the ERC2771 meta-transaction. In the burnBatch() function, the gasWrapper() modifier uses _msgSender() (the actual user) to update the state, while the callback function onTokenBurned() uses msg.sender (the relayer). This leads to accCycleBatchesBurned being recorded for the user, but lastActiveCycle being incorrectly updated for the relayer.This inconsistency disrupts the logic of claimFees() and claimRewards(). When updateStats() is run for the user, the contract incorrectly assumes there are unprocessed burned batches because accCycleBatchesBurned has been updated while lastActiveCycle has not, resulting in incorrect calculations of rewards and fees, allowing the attacker to extract excess funds for profit.

According to BlockSec monitoring, the AM/USDT pool on the BSC chain was attacked a few hours ago, with estimated losses of about $131,000.The root cause lies in a flaw in the burn mechanism, which was exploited to manipulate the AM reserves in the pool and artificially inflate the token price. The attacker first manipulated the toBurnAmount, then triggered the burn logic after adjusting the AM balance in the pool, causing the AM reserves to drop to abnormally low levels, allowing the attacker to sell the AM back to the pool at an artificially inflated price for profit.

According to BlockSec monitoring, its system detected a suspicious transaction targeting the MT-WBNB liquidity pool on BSC, with an estimated loss of approximately $242,000. The reason lies in a flaw in the buyer restriction mechanism: under deflationary mode, normal buying operations are reverted, while the router/trading pair is whitelisted, allowing attackers to bypass restrictions through router swaps and liquidity removal to obtain MT from the trading pair.The attacker then sold MT to accumulate pendingBurnAmount and called distributeFees() to directly destroy MT from the trading pair, artificially inflating the price, and then exchanged MT back to WBNB for profit. Additionally, a recommendation rule allowing the transfer of the first 0.2 MT to bypass buyer restrictions enabled the attacker to initiate the attack.

According to BlockSec monitoring, Inverse Finance is suspected to have been attacked, resulting in a loss of approximately $240,000.The incident may involve DOLA price manipulation, leading to multiple users being liquidated. Currently, BlockSec has contacted the relevant team but has not yet received a response.

Blockchain security agency BlockSec monitored and discovered that the Base and the FOOMCASH contract on the Ethereum network encountered imitation attacks, using methods similar to the previous Veil Cash vulnerability. The attacker forged zkSNARK proofs due to incorrect verification key configuration, resulting in a total loss of approximately $2.26 million for the contract.Among them, a single attack transaction on Base caused a loss of about $427,000, while approximately $1.83 million in related transactions on Ethereum are suspected to be white hat rescue operations.

According to BlockSec monitoring, the account abstraction wallet Holdstation was hacked, with multi-chain assets stolen amounting to $100,000. The hacker has transferred the stolen funds to the Bitcoin network.The Holdstation team has released an on-chain message and is attempting to negotiate with the attacker.

BlockSec released a significant vulnerability analysis of a closed-source contract, detecting a series of suspicious transactions targeting victim contracts deployed on Ethereum, Arbitrum, Base, and BSC for SwapNet and Aperture Finance, with total losses exceeding $17 million.Fundamentally, the root cause of both incidents is quite simple: the victim contracts have arbitrary call vulnerabilities due to insufficient input validation, allowing attackers to exploit this vulnerability to misuse existing token allowances and perform transferFrom to steal assets.Although the SwapNet and Aperture Finance incidents affected different protocols and blockchains, the fundamental issues in both cases are not complex: user-controlled underlying calls and insufficient input validation in contracts holding token allowances.

BlockSec, in collaboration with Bitget, has released a research report titled "AI × Trading × Security: The Evolution of Risks in the Era of Intelligent Trading 3.0." The report systematically analyzes how AI capabilities evolve and their integration with Web3, exploring how AI reshapes trading efficiency and decision-making logic in Web3. It further discusses the evolutionary trends of offensive and defensive patterns in Web3 during the AI era and the new paradigms of security. Additionally, the report outlines the application directions and real challenges of AI in the Web3 security system from the perspectives of risk control, anti-money laundering, and risk identification.In the specific case analysis, the report takes Bitget's GetAgent as an example, pointing out that it leans more towards a general trading information and advisory tool. GetAgent is not a traditional conversational bot but rather a "second brain" for traders in complex liquidity environments. Its core logic lies in the deep integration of AI algorithms and real-time multidimensional data, creating a complete closed loop that connects data, strategies, and trade execution to assist users in making more effective decisions in high-frequency, multi-variable market environments.The report concludes by stating that the deep integration of Web3 and AI has become an important trend in industry development, while security, risk control, and compliance capabilities are the key foundations for sustaining this trend. The report emphasizes the need for different institutions within the industry to collaborate in advancing technology, governance, and security standards to jointly promote the healthy and sustainable development of the intelligent trading era.

According to market news, a series of suspicious transactions targeting victim contracts deployed on Ethereum, Arbitrum, Base, and BSC were discovered a few hours ago. These transactions were carried out by contracts deployed by two creators, resulting in a total loss of over $17 million.The victim contracts are not open source and appear to have a vulnerability allowing arbitrary calls. The attackers abused existing token authorizations to execute transferFrom operations to steal assets. Affected deployers: 0xbeef63AE5a2102506e8a352a5bB32aA8B30B3112------loss of approximately $3.67 million; 0x9cb8d9BaE84830b7F5F11ee5048c04a80b8514BA------loss of approximately $13.41 million.

Blockchain security company BlockSec posted on social media that Balancer and several forked protocols have been attacked. The losses are as follows:Balancer on Ethereum chain lost $70 million;Balancer on Base chain lost $3.9 million;Balancer on Polygon chain lost $117,000;Beets on Sonic chain lost $3.4 million;Balancer on Arbitrum chain lost $5.9 million;Beethoven on Optimism chain lost $283,000.

ChainCatcher message, according to BlockSec monitoring, an unknown contract on the Base chain was attacked, resulting in a loss of approximately $219,000 (55 WETH). The cause of the attack is suspected to be improper access control, allowing arbitrary calls to the transferFrom function, leading to the theft of assets authorized by the victims.

ChainCatcher news, according to market reports, Sharwa.Finance has disclosed that it was attacked and subsequently paused operations. However, several hours later, multiple suspicious transactions occurred, suggesting that the attacker may have exploited the same underlying vulnerability through a slightly different attack path.Overall, the attacker first created a margin account, then used the provided collateral to borrow more assets through leveraged lending, and finally initiated a "sandwich attack" targeting the exchange operations involving the borrowed assets.The root cause seems to be the lack of bankruptcy checks in the swap() function of the MarginTrading contract, which is used to exchange the borrowed assets from one token (like WBTC) to another token (like USDC). This function only verifies solvency based on the account status at the start of the exchange, leaving room for manipulation during the operation process.Attacker 1 (starting with 0xd356) executed multiple attacks, profiting approximately $61,000. Attacker 2 (starting with 0xaa24) executed one attack, profiting approximately $85,000.

According to ChainCatcher news, the Web3 security company BlockSec's system monitoring has detected that a contract named D3XAT on the BSC ecosystem is suspected of being attacked, with estimated losses currently reaching $160,000.Although the contract is not open source, preliminary analysis suggests that due to the dependence on spot prices, it may be a case of price manipulation.

ChainCatcher news, according to the crypto security research organization BlockSec Phalcon, the Resupply protocol has been attacked, resulting in a loss of approximately 9.5 million dollars.

ChainCatcher news, blockchain security company BlockSec posted on social media that its system detected a hacker attack targeting the decentralized stablecoin protocol Usual (USUAL), which has currently been suspended.

ChainCatcher news, according to BlockSec Phalcon monitoring, the Web3 launcher platform WebKeyDao has been hacked, resulting in a loss of approximately $73,000. The attacker exploited an unprotected function to purchase wkeyDao tokens at a low price and sold these tokens on a decentralized exchange for profit.Specifically, the attacker utilized the purchase function in the vulnerable contract to buy 230 wkeyDao tokens for 1,159 BUSD, and then sold these tokens on the decentralized exchange for 13,167 BUSD, achieving a profit of about 10 times.