Michael Saylor Podcast Transcript: Can Bitcoin Without Cash Flow Become a Quality Asset?

Author| @nataliebrunell
Compiled by| Aki Wu on Blockchain

The content of this article does not constitute any investment or financial advice. Readers are advised to strictly comply with the laws and regulations of their respective jurisdictions.

Strategy Executive Chairman Michael Saylor stated in an interview on Natalie Brunell's podcast that the recent price trend of Bitcoin is flat, which is a sign of strength rather than weakness. The market is in a consolidation phase, with early holders gradually cashing out, while institutions are waiting to enter after volatility decreases. The core focus of the interview is "reconstructing the credit market with Bitcoin." He believes that the traditional credit market is "hungry for yield and lacks liquidity," while Bitcoin collateral can create stable cash flow without selling spot assets, integrating Bitcoin into mainstream funding channels for credit and equity indices; companies primarily pay dividends through continuous equity financing, supplemented by futures/options and other derivative instruments, and seek qualifications for ratings and inclusion in mainstream indices.

Statement: This article is a transcription of a video published on September 19, and some information may be outdated. The content does not constitute any investment advice and does not represent Wu's views and positions.

Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CbODA93ByS0\&t=195s

Why is the market sentiment towards Bitcoin weakening now?

Michael Saylor: I believe that both macroeconomic factors and community sentiment experience natural ups and downs. Bitcoin will go through periods of rapid rises and excitement, where emotions are extremely heightened, and adrenaline is surging, followed by celebrations and linear extrapolations (as if "going to the moon"). Then the price pulls back and consolidates, and many people expect a quick rebound, but instead, it moves sideways for a while.

There is always a tendency for frustration in human nature. But I don’t think there is anything to be frustrated about. The fact is, if you zoom out and look at the one-year cycle, Bitcoin has risen about 99%, nearly doubling. If someone says they have heavily invested in an asset that has nearly 100% annual growth, should they be happy? Of course, they should. It’s just that the realization path is often more volatile.

As for the recent reasons for the sideways support, I believe it is largely because about $2.3 trillion worth of Bitcoin is in a "unbanked" state, and many holders cannot obtain loans using BTC as collateral. When you hold a lot of Bitcoin but lack fiat currency and cannot borrow, the only thing you can often do is sell your coins. Currently, Bitcoin is a bit like a "Magnificent 7 level startup," where employees are extremely wealthy on paper due to options but cannot use them as collateral for loans, so they have to sell. Outsiders might ask: Are the employees selling shares because they lack confidence in the company? The answer is no— they just need to send their kids to college, buy houses, or support their parents.

So, the current selling pressure mainly comes from seasoned crypto OGs, who are diversifying their positions by about 5% or similar operations. The market is digesting this selling pressure and solidifying support, with volatility converging—this is actually a good sign. For an asset to mature, it needs more long-term capital (large enterprises and institutions) to enter; early OGs who bought in at $10 or even $1 are moderately cashing out to feel more secure; after volatility decreases, super-large institutions will enter on a large scale. The contradiction is: when super-large institutions enter and volatility decreases, the market will seem "boring" for a while, adrenaline will fade, and people's sentiment will turn bearish. But this is just a normal growth phase in the process of asset monetization.

Can Bitcoin, which has "no cash flow," become a quality asset?

Natalie Brunell: I recently attended some events alongside TradFi practitioners, and the reasons everyone gave for not allocating Bitcoin were almost unanimous: there is no cash flow; some financial institution employees are also prohibited from directly purchasing Bitcoin due to compliance. How do you view these concerns? From the perspective of TradFi, what progress have we made? What changes are needed to get more people to embrace Bitcoin?

Michael Saylor: I believe that many of the most important "property-type assets" in Western civilization—such as diamonds, gold, classical master paintings, and land—do not generate cash flow.

Many truly important things in our lives also do not generate cash flow: marriage and children do not generate cash flow, real estate does not generate cash flow; a Nobel Prize does not generate cash flow; yachts and private jets also do not generate cash flow. Many things that are widely regarded as "valuable" in the world are not judged by cash flow. Moreover, in terms of currency, "perfect money" should not have cash flow— the definition of money lies in high liquidity and strong marketability. If you want something to serve as money, it should not have too strong a "use value": for example, gold is more suitable as money than silver because it has fewer industrial uses; once materials with high use value like copper or silicon come into play, they are less suitable as money.

Some might say, "No cash flow means it's not a good investment asset." This viewpoint has mainly formed over the past two generations. Since 1971, the mainstream asset allocation concept globally has evolved to: long-term capital = a 60/40 bond-stock mix—bonds provide coupons, and equities provide dividends or profits, and the world understands assets based on this. Ultimately, the S&P 500 has become the dominant benchmark.

If we look at indexed investments, about 85% of index funds are allocated to the S&P 500. When many people talk about "long-term capital," they are thinking of funds that preserve and appreciate value using stock indices (like the S&P 500 Index). Vanguard commercialized this concept and popularized the Vanguard 500 and index fund ideas. When the idea of "a fund composed of 500 constituent stocks" achieves extreme success, and the entire institutional system of S&P, Vanguard, and mutual funds is built on this thinking, they are unlikely to immediately embrace a superior disruptive new idea; it is more about path dependence. This is a practical issue.

In an era where the dollar is the standard, the U.S. economy continues to grow, and the dollar is the world’s reserve currency, and since World War II (1945) there has never been a global world war, you are in a specific environment at a specific point in time. In the language of differential equations, this is a particular solution obtained under fixed boundary conditions: if all boundary conditions are fixed, substituting these numbers will yield the corresponding answer; as long as these assumptions/boundary conditions are not changed, this solution holds.

However, once the material changes from aluminum to steel (metaphorically, external conditions change), the original formula no longer applies. At this point, you cannot use the particular solution anymore; you need to return to the "homogeneous solution," no longer looking up formulas in a tabulated manner but deriving from first principles like a physicist. In reality, most people have never truly derived anything from first principles in their lives—they are using the "particular solutions" provided by others.

When the entire monetary system collapses, this "particular solution" method will fail. For example, in Lebanon, if your bank account is frozen and your local currency becomes worthless; in some African countries; or during a currency collapse in Argentina—even if you hold cash-flowing assets, they will be nearly worthless when valued in local currency. Ironically, those assets traditionally considered "safe and cash-flowing" become unsafe when priced in Nigerian Naira, Venezuelan Bolivar, Argentine Peso, Lebanese Pound, Iraqi Dinar, or Afghan Afghani. Similarly, in Russia, this was also the case before the severe depreciation of the Ruble in the late 1990s.

Those who cling to old views hold a set of "particular solutions" that only work within a highly stable, closed system. This system has neither undergone external stress testing nor faced genuine challenges from new ideas. Those who can truly understand Bitcoin often come from extremely chaotic environments where local currencies have collapsed, forcing them to think independently; or they are fundamentally first-principles thinkers—questioning everything like scientists and re-deriving.

Thus, the most ironic thing is: Vanguard's CEO says Bitcoin is not investable because it has no cash flow; yet the largest shareholder of my company is Vanguard. As Musk said: "The most ironic outcomes are often the most likely to occur."

What pain points do you see in the traditional fixed income space, and how can Bitcoin address them?

Michael Saylor: When discussing the credit market, you will find three characteristics. The first is mortgage-backed securities (MBS), with a leverage ratio of about 1.5 times, yielding approximately 2%--4%. There is also fiat credit—backed by the government's promise that "it can continue to print money," which sets the so-called "risk-free rate." For example, Japan is about +50 basis points, Switzerland about -50 basis points, Europe about +200 basis points per year, and the U.S. about +400 basis points per year, with a recent reduction of 25 basis points.

The second is corporate credit, supported by corporate cash flow—whether it is high-quality companies like the "Magnificent Seven" (such as Microsoft, Apple, etc.), high-yield bonds (junk bonds), or struggling companies. Their credit spreads are generally in the range of 50--500 basis points. For example, if you buy a corporate bond in Europe, it might yield 2.5% annually. However, the real monetary inflation rate is often higher.

Therefore, Japan, Switzerland, Europe, and the U.S. are all in varying degrees of a financial repression state: the nominal yield of so-called "risk-free" fiat assets is lower than the rate of monetary expansion and lower than the appreciation rate of scarce, desirable assets. This is the first challenge. The second challenge is that these instruments have poor liquidity (some are similar to old-fashioned preferred stocks), are difficult to trade, and may not trade for long periods, and are under-collateralized. The credit market we observe is weak and unhealthy. For example, if you put money in a bank in Switzerland and only get 0% or even have 50 basis points deducted, it is hard not to call this a "yield famine." Many markets are eager to create yield.

Michael Saylor: On the other hand, at an event I spoke at a few days ago, there were about 500 people. I asked, "How many of you have bank accounts?" Almost everyone raised their hands, but when I asked, "How many of you have an annual yield on your checking or savings account exceeding 4.5%?" Almost no one did. Then I asked, "If a bank account could offer an annual interest rate of 8--10%, would you be willing?" Everyone in the room was willing, but who is offering such long-term rates? No one.

The opportunity we see in the market is: unless you hold Bitcoin, possessing an asset that can store value long-term (which I call digital capital), and are willing to hold it for 30--40 years, no one will give you a fair, long-term yield. Please tell me: who will give you 10% interest for the rest of your life? Your bank won’t (long-term 10% interest), companies won’t, governments won’t, and MBS issuers won’t either.

Why is a 10% long-term interest rate difficult to establish in the traditional system?

Michael Saylor: The reason is that no company can guarantee to sustainably create returns above 10% every year; moreover, mortgage borrowers cannot afford such costs. Furthermore, established governments are also unwilling to do so; they prefer to pay you far below that level. Weak governments are forced to offer higher rates, but their currencies and political situations are often on the verge of collapse, so you cannot find a reliable national borrower that can pay such rates long-term. You can hardly find companies willing to do so—most corporate financial strategies are not about "issuing more debt and managing it well," but rather about minimizing debt and buying back stock.

We find that Bitcoin is digital capital. Bitcoin's appreciation has long outpaced the S&P 500. Once you acknowledge that Bitcoin appreciates faster than the S&P 500, and my assumption for the next 21 years is that its annual compounded growth rate is about 29%, then you can use this appreciating asset as collateral to create credit.

Bitcoin is digital capital that appreciates faster than the cost of capital; the cost of capital can be approximated by the long-term returns of the S&P 500. Credit issued against it is digital credit. This digital credit can have longer or shorter durations, can set higher yields, and can be denominated in any fiat currency because Bitcoin is stronger (more scarce, lower inflation).

A key point in the credit market is: the currency used to price debt should be weaker than the "currency" corresponding to the collateral you hold. If you price debt in a stronger currency while holding a weaker collateral asset, you will end up inverted and ultimately bankrupt. This is common in some countries where residents borrow in dollars but repay in local currency, and when the local currency collapses, they eventually go bankrupt.

Therefore, we can choose to issue debt in relatively weaker currencies like yen, Swiss francs, euros, or dollars. This way, we can bear the currency risk while offering higher yields (similar to the coupon levels of distressed debt), but cover the risk with collateral ratios far exceeding those of U.S. investment-grade companies—not 2--3 times, but 5 times or even 10 times over-collateralization.

Thus, we can create credit instruments that are lower risk, longer duration, and higher yield, and design them as quasi-perpetual structures for public issuance (listing), thereby achieving better liquidity. In summary, we aim to provide a smarter, faster, and stronger credit product that has better long-term liquidity, lower risk, and higher yield.

For any Bitcoin treasury-type company, the opportunity lies in: you hold the world's highest quality collateral—Bitcoin, which is digital capital. If you issue digital credit based on this, you can create the highest quality credit instruments globally. The volatility and yield stripped from this credit will transfer and amplify to the equity of common shareholders. Thus, you gain "amplified Bitcoin" exposure on the equity side while "taming" Bitcoin into a low-risk, low-volatility, yield-generating asset on the debt side.

What was previously labeled as "having no cash flow" is now endowed with cash flow. Ironically, many investors who prefer traditional credit—those who only want to buy cash-flowing assets—will buy bonds or even the stock of a loss-making company, even if that company’s operating cash flow cannot cover the interest payments, yet they still emphasize "at least there is cash flow." What we are doing now is generating cash flow from Bitcoin, turning it into a credit asset that can be included in bond indices; while also creating equity exposure that can outperform, allowing it to enter stock indices. Both paths can continuously raise funds, serving as entry points for capital. Capital flows into the Bitcoin ecosystem through these entry points, and we then purchase Bitcoin, thereby providing funding and momentum for the Bitcoin network.

What are perpetual preferred shares? What customizable terms do they have compared to bonds and convertible bonds?

Natalie Brunell: You pointed out that there is a serious mispricing of capital today: collateral in the traditional world is often overvalued, while Bitcoin is undervalued. Based on this, you see opportunities and have launched a series of credit tools—STRIKE, STRIDE, and now STRETCH. Let’s clarify: many people do not understand what preferred shares are. The name includes "stock/share," but in practice, they are more like credit instruments, even similar to bonds, providing yields. Can you explain the essence of preferred shares? Additionally, you issue perpetual preferred shares; what is unique about this structure in the market?

Michael Saylor: Preferred shares are a second type of stock, distinct from common stock. Common stock represents ultimate ownership of the company but typically does not have special priority or guarantees. Preferred shares can stipulate dividends: for example, fixed distributions monthly or quarterly, or floating with SOFR (Secured Overnight Financing Rate), which can be fixed or variable. You can write cash flow and yield rights into preferred shares.

Preferred shares can also set conversion terms: for instance, they may be convertible into common stock at a ratio of 1/10 or 1/5, or fully convertible. You can set certain equity upside, certain yields, and liquidation priority, and you can create higher priority levels with guarantees, such as cumulative preferred dividends—if we miss a distribution, it accumulates; or specify default penalties—missing a distribution incurs interest penalties. In summary, preferred shares are a versatile "container" where you can write various terms as needed.

Natalie Brunell: And they are not debt, right? Unlike convertible bonds, which must repay principal at maturity. You are financing through preferred shares without needing to repay principal.

Michael Saylor: Correct, it is typically different from debt instruments, which require principal repayment at some point. Of course, you can also make preferred shares "debt-like": for example, granting holders a put option requiring the company to buy back in cash; or giving it a redemption right, making it appear more like debt.

Conversely, you can make it more equity-like: for example, non-cumulative—principal never matures, and even if distributions are paused, it does not incur cumulative interest or liabilities (STRIDE is non-cumulative). Therefore, preferred shares can be adjusted across a full spectrum from very debt-like to very equity-like, making it a very flexible security form for a publicly listed company.

Michael Saylor: If you are a publicly listed company and hold a large amount of Bitcoin, you can design this type of security yourself and then publicly issue it. The first step of innovation is to "create" this tool; the second step is to list it—such as using a four-letter code (like STRC) for the IPO. The third step of innovation is: once publicly listed, you can also submit a shelf registration for it. This means that initially, you might sell a scale of $1 billion at once, and then you can almost continuously issue more, like selling $50 million weekly; it’s very similar to how ETF shares increase with capital inflows—like IBIT growing, almost "daily subscriptions and daily expansions."

Thus, when you create a publicly traded, shelf-registered preferred share, you are almost creating a "quasi-proprietary ETF." It combines the advantages of an ETF while also having the benefits of proprietary assets—because you are creating this credit tool in real-time; rather than like some "junk bond ETF," which first collects investors' funds and then buys a bunch of other people's junk bonds in the market. ETF providers merely add a "shell" to others' assets; when you turn a "digital credit tool" into a preferred share, you are actually creating a native tool whose chain runs vertically down to the underlying asset of Bitcoin.

Natalie Brunell: Over-collateralized.

Michael Saylor: Exactly, under this structure, you can design a preferred share with 10 times over-collateralization, an annualized 10% dividend, and perpetual dividend payments. Once the terms are set, I can issue a certain scale of products based on these conditions.

What problems do Strike, Strife, Stride, and Stretch each solve?

Michael Saylor: So far, we have designed four types of tools. The first is called Strike. Its concept is: pay an 8% dividend based on a face value of $100, continuously paying 8% dividends; while also giving holders a conversion ratio—can convert at 1/10 of a share into MSTR common stock. Thus, if MicroStrategy's stock price is around $350, this tool embeds about $35 of equity value. In other words, it has both equity upside and provides downside protection through liquidation priority, and can generate continuous cash flow through dividends. From a design perspective, this type of tool aims to achieve upside with minimal downside risk while earning yield during the waiting period.

The second tool is Strife (STRF), with a face value yield of 10%. Simply put, you can think of it as a "long-term (even perpetual) high-yield note," with a face value of $100, paying 10%. We also place it at a senior level in the capital structure and specify in the contract: no preferred shares with higher priority than STRF will be issued, so STRF will always be the highest priority long-term credit tool. This is important for "risk-averse" credit investors—because it means their principal amount is better protected.

This is a positive factor on the "credit" level and can elevate our credit rating in the eyes of investors. After we issued it, it traded at a price above face value, showing significant appreciation. Its pricing logic is: as the company's credit improves, market acceptance of Bitcoin increases, and Bitcoin prices rise, the price may move from 85 (discounted) back to 100 (face value), then to 110, 120, 150, or even 200. Since this is a perpetual tool, it can remain at a premium long-term, thus anchoring the company's cost of capital. In other words, if you are asking, "What should the market price be for a company with Bitcoin as its core asset and investment-grade credit for its long-term (equivalent to 30-year) debt rate?" the current market price effectively provides the answer.

The third tool is Stride (STRD). Its design is: based on Strife (STRF), it removes the two stipulations related to "penalty clauses" and "cumulative dividend clauses," keeping everything else the same. Thus, it remains a "10% dividend/yield based on face value," but its nature shifts from senior long-term credit to subordinated long-term credit. The former is more debt-like, with a higher tier in the capital structure and lower risk; the latter is closer to equity, with a lower tier and higher risk, only above common stock. After issuance, STRD trades at an effective yield of 12.7%; in contrast, STRF's effective yield is about 9%. Thus, there is a 370 basis point credit spread between the "safest" and "riskiest" tools.

Some might ask—also somewhat counterintuitive—why is Stride (STRD) issued at twice the scale of Strife (STRF) and is more successful? Clearly, it lacks cumulative dividend rights and penalties, and is subordinated. The answer is simple: they believe in Bitcoin and trust this company. At the same time, they want yield. If you put money in an account, would you prefer to earn 12.7% or 9% annually? The question becomes: do you trust the "bank" holding your funds? Once you trust the other party, and they offer you 12% instead of 9%, you will naturally choose the former.

So who will trust the company? The shareholders themselves. Just as who will trust Bitcoin? Bitcoin holders. Ultimately, it comes down to what you choose to trust. These tools bring two core benefits:

1. First, it gives those who believe in the company and Bitcoin the opportunity to earn 12.7%, which is very attractive to them;

2. Second, it allows the company to continue building collateral assets beneath senior tools, which is credit positive: beneficial for Strife, beneficial for Strike, and beneficial for everything else. Meanwhile, it also provides the company with a scalable way to leverage Bitcoin purchases, while Bitcoin itself carries no counterparty credit risk.

Theoretically, if the market can absorb $100 billion of Stride, we would issue $100 billion of Stride, raising the company's leverage to 90%, and then buy Bitcoin. This is beneficial for Bitcoin, beneficial for common stock; the rise in common stock will also benefit the "equity embedded portion" of Strike. Additionally, because we purchased a large amount of Bitcoin, it means Strife's collateral will reach 50 times over-collateralization. Therefore, this is beneficial for credit, beneficial for convertible bonds, beneficial for stocks, beneficial for Bitcoin, and beneficial for Stride holders—creating a flywheel effect. This is why we launched Stride.

The final tool is Stretch. Its starting point is: many people say they want fixed income, such as raising a 5% bank interest rate to 10%, but they do not want volatility. They do not want the market price of the principal to fluctuate by $10. If I buy in at a price of 110, and then due to interest rate changes it drops to 105, that means I have effectively lost a year's interest. Therefore, we want to find a solution that anchors the price around a face value of $100, minimizes volatility, while extracting yield.

So the core idea of Stretch is: we do not want duration risk. Products like Strife have long durations, equivalent to a 120-month interest rate duration, which causes the principal price to fluctuate significantly around face value. In fact, for every 1% change in interest rates, if the asset has a 20-year duration, the principal price may change by 20%. Therefore, we want to strip away all duration—not 120 months, but reduce it to 1 month. When you strip away duration, you also strip away volatility; after all, the volatility of a 30-year bond is much greater than that of a 1-month asset.

We aim to reduce volatility by stripping away duration. To achieve this, the product form must change to monthly rather than quarterly, so we convert dividends to monthly cash distributions and introduce a floating monthly dividend rate. This is the first time in modern capital markets that a company has issued "monthly floating dividends" on preferred shares. We call it Treasury Preferred. This is something we invented based on AI—I designed it using AI. No one had thought of doing this before because there had never been an underlying asset to support such a design. But Stretch is not a "zero-volatility high-yield checking account," nor can it allow you to deposit $1082.32 today and withdraw exactly $1082.32 tomorrow; it is not at that level yet. But it is quite close: you can put in funds you need to hold for a year and receive a 10% dividend with extremely low volatility; if you need to retrieve your funds, you can sell in the secondary market to redeem the principal.

This is more like a quasi-money market tool supported by Bitcoin collateral. Of course, it still does not achieve the low volatility of a true money market fund, but its goal is to compete at the short end of the interest rate curve underpinned by Bitcoin.

You promise not to sell Bitcoin, so where does the dividend funding supported by Bitcoin come from?

Michael Saylor: We currently have about $6 billion in these preferred shares. We pay about $600 million in dividends each year. The company's enterprise value is about $120 billion, and we sell about $20 billion in common stock each year. So you can understand it this way: we basically sell the first $600 million of common stock to pay dividends; and the remaining part of the $20 billion, we use to buy more Bitcoin.

In other words, we are raising funds in the equity capital market at a very fast pace. Only about 5% of the equity capital raised is earmarked for paying dividends, while the rest is used to increase Bitcoin holdings. In case of certain reasons that prevent us from selling stock anymore, we already hold a large amount of Bitcoin and can issue credit-type tools or sell derivatives to cope.

For example, we can sell Bitcoin derivatives—hedged short Bitcoin futures, or sell out-of-the-money call options. Additionally, there is a strategy called "basis trading," where you use your held spot Bitcoin as collateral to sell futures to hedge the spot, thus earning basis income. Therefore, the main way the company pays dividends is actually through the continuous sale of common stock; secondary methods include selling derivatives on Bitcoin. Furthermore, the credit market is also open to us, and we can occasionally enter different credit markets for financing.

Natalie Brunell: Is the goal to have these tools rated by mainstream rating agencies? What does that mean?

Michael Saylor: Yes. Our current goal is to build the company into the first Bitcoin treasury company to achieve an investment-grade rating, and more broadly, the first investment-grade crypto company; while also getting all the various tools we issue rated by rating agencies, which requires a lot of meetings and communication, but I am confident we will ultimately achieve it.

Why has it not been included in the S&P 500 to date?

Michael Saylor: The S&P 500 has a set of inclusion criteria, and it is only this quarter that we meet these standards. We have not met the criteria for the past five years. You must be profitable and meet a series of conditions. I believe it was only after we adopted fair value accounting that we became eligible. The second quarter of 2025 is the first quarter we will qualify. We do not expect to be included in the S&P 500 the first time we qualify. Tesla was not included when it first qualified either.

We are considered a disruptive new company, and this is a disruptive new asset class. For a traditional committee that tends to avoid risk and has to make decisions for billions, hundreds of billions, or even trillions of dollars, it is entirely reasonable to wait a few more quarters. They are likely to say, "Let’s see how the second quarter goes. If this business continues to show sustainability in two to five quarters…"

To be honest, if someone adopts a new idea after four quarters of performance, it would already be seen as quite innovative and aggressive. Many times, people wait three to five years to acknowledge something. So I do not expect to be included in the first quarter. I believe that after several quarters, when we have formed a performance record that can be validated by the industry, we will be included. In fact, S&P has already included Coinbase and Robinhood in the constituents. I do not think they are rejecting the crypto asset class or Bitcoin and digital assets. It’s just that exchanges have existed for hundreds of years, their history is longer, and they are easier to understand.

The so-called "Bitcoin Treasury company" is an emerging new species, highly revolutionary. I define the starting point of the entire Treasury company industry as November 5, 2024. Now we have gone through about three quarters, and it is very clear that this is a legitimate, compliant, and independent new type of company. From the market, we can see that the number of companies in the industry has grown from 60 to 185 in 12 months, and the industry is in a high-growth mode.

Natalie Brunell: We have indeed grown to nearly 200, but as you have seen, the premiums on net asset value (NAV) are converging, and some consolidation is occurring. Can you talk about the market reaction outside the Bitcoin circle? Do they see Bitcoin Treasury companies as future "institutional-level" allocations? How do they value these companies? Do you still see the adoption speed being slow? Will there be any catalysts to change this?

Michael Saylor: I believe the market is still in a learning phase. Just now, I spoke with 25 investors, and I would ask them: how familiar are you with this? For example, "Tell us about Bitcoin; will Bitcoin be banned?"—we really have to start from scratch: there has been no comprehensive ban on Bitcoin in 2023. Then we have to go through the entire crypto industry, explain various credit tools, and then explain equity. Overall, most market participants are still catching up.

To put it in perspective: it’s like it’s now 1870, and people are just starting to refine crude oil, with a wave of new companies emerging around "what can oil do." Then, someone proposes the idea of acrylic or polycarbonate (Lexan), and various petrochemical materials and products like polyester, spandex, and nylon emerge. Some talk about kerosene, others advocate using diesel or gasoline, and some discuss asphalt. All the investors sit together asking: is this a good idea? How big will this industry be? They are still struggling to figure out "how large the kerosene business can be in 180 countries." By the way, the first generation of kerosene applications was for lighting fixtures—first lighting, then engine fuel, then heating oil, and later aviation fuel, and now even rocket fuel.

Therefore, I believe this industry is still extremely early, with various companies learning how to articulate what they are doing and deciding their business models; investors are trying to understand these models and the industry; regulatory agencies are also dynamically evolving rules—everything is happening in real-time. This is a "digital gold rush." In the decade from 2025 to 2035, there will be a plethora of different business models, products, and companies that will make a lot of money, make many mistakes, and also create a lot of wealth—this is the noise and chaos of the market.

In the context of public opinion and societal division, what kind of "peaceful" coordination mechanism can Bitcoin provide?

Natalie Brunell: Many people have felt heavy-hearted over the past week. This country seems more divided than ever, with people attacking and tearing each other apart online. Do you have anything to say? Because you have clearly found a lot of hope in Bitcoin, and you always emphasize how it empowers individuals. Nothing can benefit both the rich and the poor like Bitcoin. I think we need a message of hope right now, especially in the aftermath of the Charlie Kirk incident.

Michael Saylor: The message I want to convey is: our consensus is far greater than mainstream media would have you believe. Take the Bitcoin community, for example; there are often two factions within the community. When I go online, the public opinion can be very intense, colorful, and emotionally charged; people can be swept up in emotions and lash out at me; one faction of developers may be furious with another faction. Ironically, we actually agree on 99.9% of the issues.

When you dig a little deeper, you find that incendiary content spreads more easily; rumors travel faster than the truth; extreme positions propagate more vigorously in cyberspace, on X, and in the broader ecosystem. I even notice that even during the company's most successful periods, the amount of hate and toxic information published online is often the highest. I trace back to see those accounts posting negative, hateful, accusatory content.

What I often see is: that is not a real person at all—never interacted with anyone, has only about three hundred followers, and shares no common interests with me. Upon a second look, you realize: this is a bot account. Much of the toxic, incendiary behavior online is actually guerrilla marketing: for example, those shorting my company’s stock might pay a digital marketing firm to generate bots to post大量恶意、阴阳怪气、愤世嫉俗的内容，制造一种"有抗议"的假象。在政治领域也一样：不少"情绪动员"其实是付费水军，有人花钱雇人上街、雇人发帖。然后主流媒体把镜头对准这些有偿抗议者或虚假机器人，对着镜头说"网上民情汹涌"或"某地群情激奋"，推送给上百万人，营造出社会失序与民怨沸腾的表象。不幸的是，当你把虚假的抗议不断放大，总会有极少数人被煽动到实施暴力，于是虚假就变成现实，酿成悲剧。

我想对大家说，也许这正是那场悲剧 --- --- "Kirk 事件" --- --- 带给我们的警示：社会里确实存在一些专事"制造对立"的失灵机制，它们靠放大分裂为生。只要我们对这些"分裂的扩音器"动动手术，把它们关掉，人们其实完全可以重新走到一起 --- --- 把毒性的扩音器关掉。

还有一点，就是要学会分辨：如果你读到 37 条负面评论，你会以为所有人都讨厌你。在线上我也常常觉得，大家都讨厌我做的一切；但回到现实世界，我从没遇到过一个当面表示不满的人。你会问：为什么线下的人看起来都挺开心，而线上的人却如此不开心？原因在于镜头选择。有句话叫："流血的，才上头条。"

Natalie Brunell：是的，新闻行业我太懂了。

Michael Saylor：所以镜头总在寻找"社会动荡"。但我的观点是：很多动荡是"花钱买来的"。有人在网络空间制造动荡，在现实里也制造动荡；然后不健康的媒体再去放大、扩散。大众其实已经审美疲劳、越来越警觉 --- --- 对这些系统日益增长的不信任，就是社会的免疫机制在启动。总体而言，这会催化更多积极的行为和建设性的公共参与。我很有信心、也很乐观：随着时间推移，我们会走向更健康的世界与更健康的政治共同体。但前提是：别轻信你被告知的一切，别全信你读到的一切，学会独立思考。

同时，当你发现自己的时间线上有一大堆在放大毒性的机器人账号时，不要与之互动。就像当你街角看到被雇来抗议的 52 个人时，别上去争执 --- --- 他们是拿钱办事的"雇佣兵"，你不可能说服他们，他们受雇就该持那种观点。我们在加密行业已经看到不少类似戏码：当 Greenpeace 和 Sierra Club 声称"比特币不环保"时，你也不可能说服他们 --- --- 这不是出自真诚的讨论或反馈，而是付费抗议。我希望社会能审视付费抗议带来的后果，然后退一步想想。

Natalie Brunell：归根结底，比特币更像是一场和平的变革：它可能让那些靠"注意力生意"获利的权力结构失去资金来源，并把价值转向一个更和平、对大众更有利的体系。这基本就是我从你的"比特币带来希望"的观点里得到的启发。

Michael Saylor：这就是我们一直说的，比特币是一种和平、公平、且能让我们化解分歧的方式。随着更多人采用它，和平会扩散，公平会扩散，真实会扩散，毒性会消退。