In-depth review of the bankruptcy of CoinPrint (Poolin): Understanding why platform wallets are not safe from the $163 million promissory note crisis

On July 22, 2026, Singapore-based cryptocurrency mining pool giant Poolin and its affiliated companies officially filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court in New Jersey. According to the latest disclosed court documents, Poolin currently has liabilities as high as $173 million, with the most shocking figure being $164 million in unsecured claims—stemming from the issuance of "IOUs" to tens of thousands of users after the suspension of withdrawals from its wallet in 2022.

From the issuance of IOUs due to a broken capital chain in 2022 to a complete court restructuring in 2026, this four-year delay and decline ultimately ended with users' assets shrinking into the inferior "unsecured claims" in bankruptcy court.

This prolonged crisis once again sounded the alarm for the entire cryptocurrency market: do not treat ordinary platform wallets or financial accounts as professional asset custody. A deep analysis of the underlying logic behind the Poolin IOU crisis can help investors and high-net-worth individuals recognize the stark difference between "platform credit" and "trust custody."

Restoring the Poolin IOU Crisis: From Liquidity Exhaustion to $160 Million in "Air IOUs"

Looking back on this years-long crisis, Poolin's collapse was not an overnight event but an inevitable result of asset misappropriation, high-leverage expansion, and a lack of risk control:

1. Sudden Withdrawal Suspension and the Birth of "IOU Notes" (September 2022)

As institutions like 3AC and Celsius faced consecutive failures, the cryptocurrency market fell into a deep recession in 2022. Starting from September 2, a large number of miners reported severe delays in withdrawals from the Poolin Wallet; on September 5, Poolin officially announced the suspension of all withdrawals, exchanges, and internal transfers.

To quell users' anger over their rights, Poolin launched the so-called "IOU Solution" in mid-September: it forcibly converted the real assets frozen in users' wallets, such as BTC, ETH, and USDT, into IOU certificates issued by the platform at a 1:1 ratio (such as IOUBTC, IOUUSDT, etc.). Poolin made grand promises at the time, claiming it would gradually redeem these IOUs through quarterly 1:1 buybacks, offsetting mining pool fees, or opening on-chain free trading.

However, in the absence of liquidity and real buyers in the secondary market, these certificates quickly became worthless "air numbers," constituting a serious default in fact.

2. Liquidation of Collateral and "Complete Default" on Payments (Q4 2022)

By the end of 2022, as cryptocurrency prices continued to decline, Poolin's cash flow was completely exhausted, and the promised quarterly payments unsurprisingly "defaulted." Affected users initiated collective rights protection actions on channels like Telegram, and some large investors even launched emergency arbitration at the Singapore International Arbitration Centre (SIAC), demanding the return of their frozen assets. But by this time, Poolin was beyond saving.

3. The Crisis Roots Revealed by Bankruptcy Documents

With the disclosure of the Chapter 11 bankruptcy documents in 2026, the true reasons behind Poolin's underlying asset holes were fully exposed:

• Private Misappropriation and Leveraged Borrowing: Poolin, without risk isolation, used its wallet users' assets as collateral to borrow large sums from third-party lending institutions (such as Antalpha).

• Heavy Asset Expansion Missteps: Poolin invested borrowed funds heavily into building large mining farms and purchasing mining machines in Texas, only to face severe construction delays and insufficient local power quotas, which trapped the funds.

• Chain Liquidation Squeezing Liquidity: The bear market in 2022 led to a sharp drop in cryptocurrency prices, triggering margin calls from lenders. Unable to provide additional collateral, Poolin's pledged assets were forcibly liquidated by lenders like Antalpha, creating an unfillable hole in the wallet treasury.

Fatal Misunderstanding: How Platform Wallets Turn Your Assets into "Corporate Liabilities"?

The Poolin incident exposed a major misunderstanding among many investors regarding asset safety—the belief that putting money in a "wallet app" equates to safe custody.

In traditional finance or untrustworthy cryptocurrency platforms, the underlying operational logic of ordinary wallets is often "on-balance sheet":

When users deposit assets into an ordinary wallet, the ownership of those assets becomes blurred legally and financially. The platform mixes user funds with its own operational funds and may even leverage them through re-hypothecation.

Once the platform makes investment mistakes or encounters a market black swan, users' absolute property rights can instantly diminish to "unsecured claims" against the platform. In Chapter 11 bankruptcy court, these wallet users holding IOUs must queue with suppliers, lenders, and various creditors to share the extremely limited remaining liquidation assets.

The Breakthrough Path of Compliant Custody: Building a Strong "Bankruptcy Isolation" Defense Line with Compliant Trust Structures

"Not your keys, not your coins" is the belief of crypto enthusiasts; in the world of institutional finance, "Not your qualified trust, not your assets" is the ultimate rule for ensuring fund safety.

As a licensed professional compliant digital asset custody institution, Cactus Custody fundamentally cuts off the possibility of platform credit risk transmitting to user assets from both legal logic and technical architecture:

1. True Legal Bankruptcy Isolation (Bankruptcy Remote)

This is the fundamental legal boundary between compliant custody and ordinary wallets. Based on a strict trust law framework, the assets deposited by clients into the custody institution belong to the clients' absolute private property and are strictly placed off the custody institution's balance sheet.

This means that even under extreme assumptions, if the custody institution itself faces any financial crisis or bankruptcy liquidation, client assets will absolutely not be included in the bankruptcy liquidation asset pool. No creditor of the platform has the right to pursue client assets, and clients can withdraw their assets in full at any time.

2. Absolute Asset Isolation and Zero Re-hypothecation

The root of the Poolin tragedy lies in the private re-hypothecation of user assets to third-party lenders, akin to FTX misappropriating customer assets for high-leverage investments. Institutions holding trust licenses must adhere to the highest level of fiduciary duty, establishing a completely independent asset isolation system in both technology and operations. Without explicit authorization from clients, custody service providers are strictly prohibited from re-hypothecating, lending, pledging for mining, or engaging in off-balance operations with client assets, completely eliminating the risk of funding breaks caused by third-party liquidations.

Conclusion: Returning Fund Custody to Its Essence

The painful case of Poolin, which took four years and ultimately led to $163 million in liabilities and bankruptcy restructuring, once again warns the industry: managing user assets as if they were corporate debts is essentially a gamble destined to explode.

For institutional investors, Web3 project parties, and high-net-worth individuals, the bottom line of asset safety should not be built on "blind trust" in any single platform or founder but must be established within a solid fortress constructed from legal constraints, trust isolation, and technical defenses.

Do not treat platform wallets as a safe haven for assets. Choosing compliant custody not only selects an institutional-level on-chain financial system with cold and hot isolation and multi-level risk control but also chooses a contract strongly protected by modern trust laws.

Let custody return to its purest essence—your assets always and only belong to you.

Reference Materials:

[1] https://backend.theenergymag.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Poolin-Chap-11.pdf

[2] https://medium.com/@PoolinWalletOfficial/%E5%85%B3%E4%BA%8E%E5%B8%81%E5%8D%B0%E9%92%B1%E5%8C%85%E6%8F%90%E5%B8%81%E9%97%AE%E9%A2%98%E7%9A%84%E5%85%AC%E5%91%8A-cbda9e825ac9

[3] https://theenergymag.com/news/2026-07-23/poolin-chapter-11-bitcoin-pool