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first_img NEAR Intents released a post-mortem report, revealing that the $3.8 million vulnerability originated from a deposit notification flaw

The cross-chain exchange protocol NEAR Intents released a post-mortem report attributing a $3.8 million vulnerability to a flaw in the deposit notification feature. The protocol deploys a public settlement contract on NEAR that maintains an internal ledger of deposited tokens, while withdrawals transfer tokens out via a cross-chain bridge. The report was published by NEAR Intents General Manager Alex Shevchenko on October 16, stating that the attacker withdrew $3.8 million before the protocol was shut down on October 1 and returned all funds within 36 hours of detection, with all affected users fully compensated.The report indicates that the feature notifies third-party contracts when tokens are deposited. The attacker created a contract that intentionally caused the notification to fail, allowing the token contract to refund the deposit while NEAR Intents retained the corresponding ledger credit. Through 23 failed deposit transactions, the attacker accumulated $3.8 million in unsupported balance, referred to in the report as ghost funds, and subsequently withdrew real tokens based on this and transferred them to other chains via the Omni infrastructure. Shevchenko stated that this was a vulnerability in the NEAR Intents contract, not in the Omni infrastructure.Withdrawals occurred between September 29 and October 1. The settlement contract was paused and reopened on October 1, with affected routes gradually restored, and contract-side deposits resumed on October 2. The report noted that the vulnerability went undetected because monitoring only compared the original chain assets with the total balance of NEAR side tokens, without comparing the total internal user balances with the actual tokens held by the contract; the team has since added this check and will automatically pause the contract when there is a balance inconsistency. The fix for the October vulnerability was deployed on October 2, but another serious vulnerability report regarding the same feature prompted its complete removal on October 7, with the relevant researcher receiving a $300,000 reward.

Bitget CEO live-streamed a response to the platform's first security incident in eight years: the attack originated from a vulnerability in a third-party security product, and the losses will be covered by the user protection fund

In today's community live broadcast, Bitget CEO Gracy responded to recent security incidents and the platform's financial status. She candidly stated that this is the first security incident encountered since Bitget was established 8 years ago. After a complete trace, it was found that hackers exploited vulnerabilities in third-party security products to steal internal network access credentials, forged withdrawal commands to the wallet system, and deceived the wallet into executing abnormal transfers that bypassed risk checks. Gracy emphasized that no private keys were leaked, and cold wallets were unaffected; specific technical details will be disclosed in the formally released security report.Gracy pointed out that the verified losses from this incident are within the coverage of the protection fund, and user funds are not affected. The platform's own funds exceed $1.4 billion, which includes approximately $464 million in the user protection fund. The platform will continue to uphold the security commitments made when the protection fund was established in 2022, planning to replenish the fund to the baseline of $300 million within a week."The protection fund is not just a slogan, but an important mechanism that provides tangible security for users in the event of extreme security incidents," Gracy stated. In the face of sudden security challenges, the platform's comprehensive strength and its ability to take responsibility are important criteria for measuring its risk response capability and long-term credibility. Bitget will continue to uphold its long-term commitment to prioritize user interests.

Axelar responds to security incident: Axelar and IBC are unaffected, the vulnerability originates from a third-party token contract's "infinite minting" issue

The cross-chain protocol Axelar Network released a statement regarding the recent security incident related to Secret Network, stating that there is a misunderstanding within the community about the event. Both Axelar and the Inter-Blockchain Communication Protocol (IBC) were not attacked or compromised. The affected token smart contracts were neither developed, deployed, nor maintained by Axelar, and Axelar's firewall mechanism also prevented the impact from spreading to other chains.It is reported that the exploited contract is a forked version based on CW20-ICS20, but the developers removed two core security checks, resulting in an "infinite minting" vulnerability. By deleting the verification mechanisms originally used to prevent such issues, this fork altered the original trust model of the contract and did not undergo a new security audit.Axelar Network explained that anyone can deploy contracts for cross-chain asset wrapping through IBC, and similar contracts have also been used to wrap tokens from other chains into Secret Network. However, the Secret side fork version in this incident has vulnerabilities due to the removal of key security checks. This incident is not a unique logical flaw, nor is it an issue with the IBC protocol itself, but rather a security risk introduced by modifications to third-party contracts.

Venus Protocol: THE market event originated from a supply cap vulnerability, not a flash loan attack

Venus Protocol released a statement regarding the THE market event, stating that this incident was not a flash loan attack, but rather a result of the attacker exploiting a supply cap vulnerability in the old code of the protocol. The team indicated that the attacker had been accumulating THE tokens for about 9 months, gradually establishing a dominant supply position on Venus.The announcement pointed out that the attacker bypassed the normal deposit process by directly transferring THE tokens into the protocol contract, thereby breaking through the supply cap limit of 14.5 million THE. They manipulated DEX prices by taking advantage of the low on-chain liquidity. As the external price was gradually reflected by the TWAP oracle, the attacker borrowed assets (such as CAKE, BNB, etc.) against the inflated collateral value, then bought more THE to drive up the price, and continuously transferred THE into the vTHE market to increase the collateral value. This cycle once pushed the price from about $0.27 to about $0.53, ultimately leaving bad debt in the protocol after the positions were liquidated.Venus stated that it has currently suspended the THE market, reduced its collateral factor to 0, and suspended withdrawals. Additionally, as a precautionary measure, the collateral factors for 8 markets including BCH, LTC, AAVE, POL, FIL, TWT, UNI, and lisUSD have also been reduced to 0. The team and security partners are continuing to investigate and will release a complete post-analysis report in the future.
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