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Behind the Amber turmoil, the nine-year crossroads with Wintermute

Core Viewpoint
Summary: Viewing Amber as "another market maker that has collapsed" not only misreads its changes over the past few years but also overlooks the differentiation occurring in the market-making industry.
Zhou
2026-11-16 20:26:51
Viewing Amber as "another market maker that has collapsed" not only misreads its changes over the past few years but also overlooks the differentiation occurring in the market-making industry.

Author: Zhou, ChainCatcher

Recently, an 11-page anonymous whistleblower letter has circulated in various cryptocurrency industry chat groups. The whistleblower claims to be a former executive of Amber Group, accusing the company's management of misappropriating client funds and engaging in conflicts of interest.

On Monday afternoon, Amber Group issued a statement claiming that the allegations are false, the company's operations are normal, and it is preserving evidence while reserving the right to pursue legal responsibility.

Many voices point out that only when the tide goes out can we see how many people are swimming naked in this industry, with even top-tier market makers starting to hear such news.

In fact, over the past few years, Amber has shifted its focus to wealth management and AI agents, and market making is no longer its main business.

In contrast, Wintermute, which started around the same time as Amber, recently secured about 76% of the highest priority data seat auction on Hyperliquid, becoming one of the most aggressive traders on-chain.

Both companies' founding teams come from traditional financial trading desks, but they have now diverged.

Behind the Amber turmoil, the nine-year crossroads with Wintermute

1. Amber Gradually Moves Away from Market Making

Amber started with market making, and most of its six co-founders are Chinese, with several coming from Wall Street trading desks. Founder Michael Wu was previously a foreign exchange and interest rate trader at Morgan Stanley.

It is reported that in 2017, he and several colleagues used machine learning for pricing and trading, quickly discovering that about 95% of their revenue and profits came from the cryptocurrency market, leading to a full pivot to crypto in early 2018.

In its early days, Amber primarily provided market making and liquidity services to hedge funds, venture capital, and family offices, gradually building a reputation among institutional clients by continuously quoting during volatile markets.

During the bull market in 2021, Amber began rapid expansion, venturing into the metaverse, NFTs, and payment card businesses, launching products aimed at individual users, and making several external acquisitions.

Valuations also soared. In February 2022, Amber completed a financing round involving Temasek, reaching a valuation of $3 billion.

At the end of the year, the collapse of FTX interrupted this round of expansion. Reports indicated that about $60 million of Amber's funds were frozen in FTX, and its staff shrank from about 1,100 at peak to around 300, with all C-end operations shut down by the end of that year.

Since then, Amber has not returned to its old path of market making. In March 2025, its wealth management business Amber Premium went public on Nasdaq through a merger with the U.S. listed company iClick.

In the same year, Amber's accelerator launched the AgentFi platform AIAC and issued its first AI agent token MIA. The company almost completely shifted towards AI.

Luke Li, a co-founder who long managed the group's trading business, resigned from the AMBR board in December 2025 to become a company advisor. In June of this year, Michael Wu stepped down as CEO of Amber Group to focus full-time on the publicly listed company AMBR.

AMBR launched an AI market making system called A-MM, which only confirmed its first revenue of $3.5 million in the second quarter of this year.

In October this year, AMBR announced the termination of its acquisition of Hong Kong WhaleFin Markets, which would also withdraw its application for a virtual asset trading platform license in Hong Kong, citing that the relevant license could only bring limited commercial benefits.

Regarding this nine-year transition, Michael Wu candidly stated in an interview and self-narrative this year that the expansion in 2021 was too aggressive, and he regretted the approach after sending executives a bilingual version of "Lightning Expansion." The collapse of FTX was the biggest setback in his entrepreneurial career and life; at that time, a pre-IPO financing term sheet had already indicated an $8 billion valuation.

In 2024 and 2025, he devoted about 70% of his time and nearly all his interest to AI agents. Friends joked that he was like a professor teaching during the day and selling skewers at the school gate at night. This led to strategic differences within the company, as the trading and investment business lines did not align with his direction, causing many early partners to leave one after another.

Behind the Amber turmoil, the nine-year crossroads with Wintermute

2. Wintermute Puts Resources into Top-Level Competition

Wintermute was also founded in 2017 by three former Optiver traders and developers, with Evgeny Gaevoy serving as CEO.

It also experienced the winter of 2022, during which Wintermute lost about $160 million due to a wallet security vulnerability, and Gaevoy admitted that the company struggled to be profitable that year.

Unlike Amber, Wintermute continued to stay in the trading lane after the downturn and has been paying for speed and information. During the Terra collapse, it built its own servers and ran Terra nodes just to obtain on-chain trading and price information as quickly as possible.

This year, it continued the same strategy on Hyperliquid. Hyperliquid launched a priority data auction mechanism in April, auctioning every three minutes, with three seats available, allowing the highest seat to see unexecuted orders about 60 milliseconds earlier than participants without priority.

According to a report by Bloomberg on November 12, a wallet marked as Wintermute by the on-chain analysis platform Loris Tools won about 76% of the highest priority seat auctions in the past month.

Gaevoy stated that traditional trading firms need to invest in low-latency networks, microwave towers, and data center hosting, and building this infrastructure requires funding, time, and expertise. In contrast, auctions make this competition more transparent.

However, the speed advantage is not the main source of Wintermute's profits. On-chain analyst Psyche reported that the main account marked as Wintermute has accumulated profits of about $229.7 million on Hyperliquid since 2024, with about $204 million earned before the auction mechanism was launched.

Behind the Amber turmoil, the nine-year crossroads with Wintermute

In the seven months since the auction launched, the account has made about $25.6 million in profits, with seat expenditures of about $3.58 million during the same period. Psyche believes that the account still holds a large number of perpetual positions used for hedging OTC and token collaboration inventories, and the priority only brings marginal improvements to market making operations.

After November 11, Wintermute significantly reduced its bidding, focusing its efforts in the hours following the U.S. stock market opening, spending about $10,000 per day.

Outside of Hyperliquid, according to a report by Bloomberg in August, Wintermute plans to invest about $1 billion over the next five years to build high-frequency trading and AI infrastructure, with all funding coming from retained earnings.

In the same month, the Wall Street Journal reported that Wintermute's U.S. subsidiary completed its broker-dealer registration, qualifying it to apply for designated market maker status on the New York Stock Exchange and Nasdaq, and will compete directly with firms like Jane Street Capital and Citadel Securities.

Currently, the non-crypto market accounts for about 10% of the company's revenue, with a goal to increase it to over 50% by the end of 2027.

Also diversifying, Wintermute's every expansion revolves around its core capability in trading and market making, with only the asset classes changing.

3. The Middle Layer of the Market Making Industry is Being Squeezed Out

Behind Wintermute's choices is the differentiation of the entire market making industry.

Gaevoy recently publicly stated that the middle layer of the market making industry has become increasingly difficult to operate in recent years, and AI is accelerating this trend. Many medium-sized trading firms cannot afford the arms race in latency, nor can they compete in AI.

In his view, top trading firms generate net trading revenues of hundreds of billions of dollars each year, and spending tens of billions on AI is just small change.

Smaller market makers can survive by deeply cultivating niche markets, such as stock-linked digital assets. Companies caught in the middle have neither the scale of the top nor the expertise of the bottom.

The auction mechanism of Hyperliquid makes this stratification clearly visible. According to official documentation, to fully enjoy the speed advantage of the highest seats, one needs to directly connect to non-validated nodes operated by Hyper Foundation. Direct connection qualifications include staking 10,000 HYPE, having a 14-day order volume that accounts for over 0.5% of the entire network, and maintaining a 98% online rate for one's own nodes. At current prices, just staking alone would require about $660,000.

Statistics from Psyche show that as of November 15, the cumulative expenditure on auctions was about $7.33 million, with Wintermute, Selini Capital, and one unnamed market maker contributing a total of 99%, while the remaining 40 addresses combined contributed less than 1%.

Behind the Amber turmoil, the nine-year crossroads with Wintermute

Wintermute only bids for the highest seats, Selini bets on both sides, and that unnamed market maker specializes in picking up the scraps, having staked 10,236 HYPE just over the threshold.

The losers in this speed race are mainly the peers without priority. Hyperliquid's matching rules favor the order submitters, and order cancellations are executed before market orders.

When a large market order consumes multiple price levels, the market maker who first sees the order can cancel their order in advance, and the order will be executed at the quotes of the slower market makers. In other words, market makers do not need to be faster than the order takers, just faster than other market makers.

Conclusion

In short, market making is becoming a competition of capital and technology among a few institutions. The divergence between Amber and Wintermute illustrates that to stay at the top, resources must be consistently focused on the same capabilities.

This may also relate to the environment they face. Wintermute is rooted in London and has now obtained broker-dealer registration in the United States, with a clear regulatory path. Many Chinese teams, however, have long lacked a stable home base and can only rotate between Singapore, Dubai, and Hong Kong to apply for licenses.

Chinese capital and teams have long dominated the mining and exchange sectors, but have always lacked top players in market making. Amber was once not far from the top; its nine years may be a footnote to this gap.

Therefore, viewing Amber as "another market maker that has collapsed" misreads its changes over the past few years and overlooks the differentiation occurring in the market making industry.

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